Unraveling Japan-South Korea Relations: An Empirical Analysis by Jung Kim
33
PRESENTATION
Unraveling Japan-South Korea 
Relations: An Empirical Analysis
Jung Kim, Ph.D.＊
Assistant Professor
University of North Korean Studies
Introduction
　Scholars have produced a substantial number of studies on Japan-
South Korea relations.  Among others, Glosserman and Snyder (2015), 
Lee and Kimiya (2015), Kim and Abe (2015), Lee and Isozaki (2015), 
Kimura (2014), Dudden (2008), and Lind (2008) represent a subset of 
the most recent notable contributions to the literature that have a 
wide audience in the field.  To complement these decent research 
outputs, in this article, I attempt to appraise the evolution of Japan-
South Korea relations, placing the case in cross-national and time-
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serial context with comparable empirical data. Specifically, I trace 
the evolution of Japan-South Korea relations, focusing on two 
interconnected questions: (1) whether Japan-South Korea relations 
are going through the worst stage; and (2) why Japan-South Korea 
relations have evolved as they have.
　In the next section, I attempt to assess Japan-South Korea relations 
with emphasis on descriptive inference. I conduct a comparative 
empirical study to examine the validity of the claim that we are going 
through the worst period of Japan-South Korea relations. I close 
this section, showing that Japan-South Korea relations are uniquely 
deteriorating compared to other Asia-Pacific bilateral relations and 
unprecedentedly worsening compared to other temporal periods of 
both nations.
　The penultimate section deals with what best accounts for the worst 
Japan-South Korea relations. Decomposing the factors that shape 
Japan-South Korea relations into international and domestic ones, 
I uncover the uneven development in the distribution of material 
and ideational powers surrounding Japan and South Korea. On the 
balance of material powers, structural symmetry that characterizes 
Japan-South Korea relations perplexes Japanese and elevate South 
Korean in terms of national pride. On the balance of ideational 
powers, structural asymmetry that characterizes Japan-South Korea 
relations makes the two nations diverge in dealing with the rise of 
China and historical reconciliation issues. On top of this, I find that 
strategic situations that shape the policy choices of political elites 
differ between the two countries. In Japan where conservatization 
of political elites has continued, it is hard for political leaders to 
send sincere apologetic remembrance to South Koreans due to 
the lack of political pressure from progressives. In South Korea 
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where polarization of political elites has proceeded, it is difficult 
for conservative (progressive) political leaders to receive strategic 
apologetic remembrance from Japanese due to anticipated backlash 
from progressive (conservative) oppositions. I conclude this article 
with the finding that this worst period of Japan-South Korea relations 
is attributable to international factors that make the two nations 
diverge in dealing with the critical issues and domestic factors that 
make it difficult to send and receive apologetic remembrance each 
other.
Are we going through the worst period of Japan-South Korea 
relations?
　Following Katzenstein and Keohane (2007: 12), I view anti-Japanese 
(or anti-South Korean) sentiment as a “psychological tendency to hold 
negative views of Japan (or South Korea) and of Japanese (or South 
Korean) society in general.” The simplest way to view anti-Japanese 
(or anti-South Korean) sentiment is as measured by results of public 
opinion polls that express negative views toward Japan (or South 
Korea) or toward Japanese (or South Koreans).
Table 1 How Asia-Pacific Publics See Japan and South Korea
Japan South Korea
2008 2015 2008 2015
Australia 17 10 19 25
China 69  81 29 41
India - 16 - 19
Indonesia 14 13 30 27
Japan 30 15 40  75 
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Malaysia - 9 - 21
Pakistan 19 15 28 20
Philippines - 12 - 23
South Korea 51  73 7 17
United States 11 18 25 31
Vietnam - 8 - 8
Median 19 15 28 23
Lower Quartile 15.5 12.25 22 20.25
Upper Quartile 40.5 17 29.5 29
Lower Boundary of Outlier Range -22 5.125 10.75 7.125
Upper Boundary of Outlier Range 78 24.125 40.75 42.125
Lower Boundary of Far Out Range -59.5 -2 -0.5 -6
Upper Boundary of Far Out Range 115.5 31.25 52 55.25
Source: Pew Research Center (2015).
Notes: Underlined bold font indicates outliers and shaded bold font 
indicates far-outs.
　Let us first consider whether we are going through the worst Japan-
South Korea relations with a cross-national perspective. The question 
is: are current Japan-South Korea relations unique in their sourness 
in the region compared to other bilateral relations? To answer this 
query, I conduct an empirical exploration with cross-national public 
opinion data.  
　Table 1 compares negative views on Japan and South Korea by 
respondents of eleven Asia-Pacific nations to the Pew Research 
Center’s polls in 2008 and 2015. Columns Japan and South Korea show 
the percentage of respondents who have somewhat unfavorable and 
very unfavorable opinion of Japan and South Korea, respectively.  
　For starters, in 2008, most of the neighbors send relatively low levels 
of negative signals toward Japan and South Korea with the median 
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values of 19 and 28, respectively. No countries can be classified as 
“outlier” or “far out” nations with regard to anti-Japanese (or anti-
South Korean) sentiment. 
1
For Japan, while the responses of South 
Korea and China are outside of the interquartile range, they are 
still not outside of the outlier range. For South Korea, whereas the 
responses of Japan and Indonesia get out of the interquartile range, 
they are still far from being outliers. In other words, in 2008, both 
nations live in the comfort zone in terms of anti-Japanese (or anti-
South Korean) sentiment among the Asia-Pacific publics.
　Second, in 2015, while most Asia-Pacific countries show even lower 
levels of unfavorable attitudes toward Japan and South Korea as 
indicated in the values of median that drop to 15 and 23, respectively, 
there emerge clear “far out” nations in regard to anti-Japanese (or 
anti-South Korean) sentiment. For Japan, China with the score of 81 
and South Korea with the score of 73 go beyond the upper boundary 
of “far out” range. For South Korea, Japan with the score of 75 
breaks the upper boundary of “far out” range.  It is notable that the 
proportion of respondents who say “unfavorable” toward Japan (or 
South Korea) among other neighborsnever exceeds 50 percent.  To 
put it differently, in 2015, the attitudes of Japanese (or South Koreans) 
toward South Korea (or Japan) is leaning exceptionally to the 
negative side compared to those of other neighboring countries.
　In sum, from Table 1 that shows cross-national comparison of 
unfavorability of Japan and South Korea among Asia-Pacific publics 
1  If Q1 and Q3 are the lower and upper quartiles respectively, then one 
could define an outlier to be any observation outside the range:
[Q1 – k(Q3 – Q1), Q3 + k(Q3 – Q1)]
for some nonnegative constant k, where k = 1.5 indicates an “outlier,” and 
k = 3 indicates data that is “far out.”  See Gailmard (2014: 21-32).
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in 2008 and 2015, it is clear that Japan-South Korea relations are 
getting worse and worse in the hearts and minds of the people in 
both nations and their bitterness are exceptional in the Asia-Pacific 
region.
　Next, consider whether we are going through the worst period 
of Japan-South Korea relations longitudinally. The question is: are 
current Japan-South Korea relations distinctive in their bitterness 
in the bilateral history? For answering the inquiry, I conduct an 
empirical exploration with time-series public opinion data.
　Figure 1 illustrates the longitudinal percentage changes of 
respondents of Japanese (or South Korean) who show “unfavorable” 
attitudes to South Korea (or Japan) from 1991 until 2015 in alternate 
years. I use public opinion data produced by Japan’s Cabinet Office 
for Japanese responses and those by Asahi Shimbun-Donga Ilbo, 
Gallup Korea, and Pew Research Center for South Korean responses. 
2
　First, in the side of Japan, it seems that there are three distintive 
temporal orders with regard to anti-South Korean sentiment. During 
the 1990s, a majority of Japanese send negative signals to South Korea 
with the highest unfavorability score of 57.5 in 1997.  Since 1999 when 
the score falls below 50, anti-South Korean sentiment among the 
Japanese public steadily fades away during the 2000s and takes the 
lowest unfavorability score of 34.2 in 2009. After 2011 with the score 
of 35.3, anti-South Korean sentiment of the Japanese people suddenly 
surges in 2013 with the score of 58 and reaches all time high in 2015 
with the score of 64.7. It might not be a coincidence that President 
Lee Myung-bak visited Dokdo (Takeshima) in 2012 and anti-South 
Korean sentiment of Japanese swelled in 2013.  In a nutshell, while 
2  For details of the data, see Appendix.
Unraveling Japan-South Korea Relations: An Empirical Analysis 39
up until 2011 there had been a solid downturn in anti-South Korean 
sentiment among the Japanese public, the trend is overturned making 
Japan-South Korea relations the worst over the recent twenty-five 
years on the Japanese Archipelago.
Figure 1 How Japanese and South Korea Publics See Each Other
Sources: Japan’s Cabinet Office (2016) for Japanese unfavorability toward 
South Korea; for South Korean unfavorability toward Japan, Isozaki (2015) 
for the 1995 and 1999 data; Pew Research Center (2015) for the 2013 data; and 
Gallup Korea (2015) for the 1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 
and 2015 data.
　Second, in the side of South Korea, the patterns of anti-Japanese 
sentiment are more volatile and unstable. During the recent twenty-
five years, there are only two times that respondents who say 
“unfavorable” to Japan fall short of a majority: the score of 43 in 1999 
and 44 in 2011. These exceptions might have something to do with the 
facts that the South Korean governemnt officially opened the markets 
for Japanese entertainment indutries in 1999 and the Great East 
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Japan earthquake occurred in 2011. Before the 2010s, anti-Japanese 
sentiment moves in series of zigzags, going beyond the score of 70 in 
1997, 2005, and 2009 and then falling below 70 each time. What makes 
the 2010s distinctive in the history of anti-Japanese sentiment of South 
Koreans is that the unfavorability scores pass 70 and stays there. In 
sum, among the South Korean pubic, while anti-Japanese sentiment 
had bobbed up and down up until 2011, it resolutely gathers 
momentum to an unprecedented extent, making Japan-South Korean 
relations poorest in the last two decades on the Korean Peninsula.
　In sum, are we going through the worst period of Japan-South 
Korea relations?  With an eye on cross-national comparison, the 
answer would be the affirmative: According to a 2015 international 
poll, 73 percent of South Koreans view Japan unfavorably, making 
South Korea, after China, the country with the second most negative 
perception of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. Likewise, 75 percent 
of Japanese show disapproving attitude toward South Korea, making 
Japan the nation with the most negative perception of South Korea in 
Asia-Pacific neighboring countries.
　With a view from historical perspective, the answer appears 
affirmative: According to 2015 domestic polls, 64.7 percent of 
Japanese look unfavorably at South Korea, making 2015 the year 
that records the highest anti-South Korean sentiment in the last two 
decades of its history. Likewise, 74 percent of South Korean reveal 
their unfavorability toward Japan, making 2015 the year that marks 
one of the highest anti-Japanese sentiment during the recent twenty-
five years of its history.
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Why have Japan-South Korea relations been getting worse?
　As it is confirmed that we are going through the worst period of 
Japan-South Korea relations, it seems natural to raise a question: 
Why have Japan-South Korea relations been getting worse?  
Figure 2 GDP of Japan and South Korea, 1980-2015
Source: OECD (2016).
　To answer the question, I propose an explanation that contains 
international and domestic factors in shaping the relations between 
Japan and South Korea. Let us first consider international factors 
that contribute to worsening Japan-South Korea relations.  There are 
two structural factors: (1) the distribution of material powers that is 
charaterized by convergence to a balance and symmetry between 
the two countries; and (2) the distribution of ideational powers that is 
charaterized by divergence from a balance and asymmentry between 
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the two nations.  
　For starters, disparity in hard powers between Japan and South 
Korea has dwindled.  Three indicators of hard powers are introduced: 
(1) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a measure of economic powers; 
(2) Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) as a measure 
of military powers; and (3) GDP per capita as a measure of social 
powers.
　Figure 2 displays the longitudinal changes of GDP of both nations 
from 1980 until 2015. In 1980, the size of Japanese economy was larger 
than that of South Korea by a factor of eleven. At that time, while 
Japan’s GDP was about a trillion US dollars, South Korea’ GDP is 
about 90 billion US dollars. The gap of economic powers between the 
two countries fell to a factor of five in 1995 when Japan’s GDP was 2.9 
trillion US dollars while South Korea’s GDP was 600 billion US dollars. 
Since 2009 when the gap declined to a factor of less than three, the 
economic power disparity continues to shrink up until 2015 when 
Japan’s GDP with 4.7 trillion US dollars is larger than South Korea’s 
GDP with 1.7 trillion US dollars by a factor of 2.7. During the recent 
twenty-five years, while Japan has developed its economy by a factor 
of 4.7, South Korea has grown its economy by a factor of nineteen. 
The economic-power gap between the two countries has certainly 
decreased.
　Military power disparity between Japan and South Korea from 
1980 until 2007 is illustrated in Figure 3. As a composite index of six 
indicators including iron and steel production, military expenditures, 
military personnel, primary energy consumption, total population, 
and urban population, CINC measures the percentage proportion 
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of a nation’s military powers to a world total military powers. 
3
In 
1980, Japan’s military capability was greater than South Korea’s by a 
factor of 3.8. The former secured about 5.3 percent of world military 
powers while the latter had about 1.4 percent. The gap declined to 
a factor of less than three in 1990 when Japan contained 5.6 percent 
and South Korea 1.9 percent and to a factor of less than two in 2004 
when the former had 4.7 percent and the latter 2.4 percent. In 2007, 
the gap is about a factor of 1.8 in which Japan holds 4.3 percent and 
South Korea 2.4 percent. During the recent two decades, the disparity 
between the two countries in terms of military powers has evidently 
declined as Japan has expanded its military capability by a factor of 0.8 
and South Korea by a factor of 1.7.
3　 For more details, see Correlates of War Project (2016).
Figure 3 Military Capabilities of Japan and South Korea, 1980-2007
Source: Correlates of War Project (2016).
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　Figure 4 shows time-serial changes in GDP per capita of the two 
countries from 1980 and 2015.  In 1980, Japanese were richer than 
South Koreans by a factor of 3.6. GDP per capita of Japan was more 
than 8,500 US dollars while that of South Korea was about 2,400 US 
dollars. The gap dwindled to a factor of less than two in 1993 when 
Japan’s GDP per capita was more than 210,000 US dollars and South 
Korea’s about 110,000. In 2015, GDP per capita of both nations is 
virtually the same: 37,121 US dollars for Japan and 34,502 US dollars 
for South Korea. There is only 7.5 percent differential between the 
two. For the recent twenty-five years, Japanese have raised their 
income by a factor of 4.3 and South Koreans by a factor of 14.4. In 
terms of social powers, South Koreans have nearly caught up to the 
Japanese.
　In a nutshell, as shown in changes in economic, military, and social 
balance of powers between the two countries, power asymmetry that 
Figure 4 GDP per capita of Japan and South Korea, 1980-2015
Source: OECD (2016).
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had characterized Japan-South Korea relations is being replaced 
by power symmetry that could make Japanese disturbed and South 
Koreans exalted.  
　Unlike the distribution of material powers that converge to a 
balance, the distribution of ideational powers diverges from a balance 
between Japan and South Korea. Among others, this is clear in the 
threat perception of China’s rise and America’s decline between the 
two nations.
　Figure 5 illustrates how Japanese and South Koreans see the United 
States and China from 2002 until 2015. The unfavorability of Japanese 
toward the United States was upward up until 2008 and then declined 
and slightly surged until 2015.  In particular, since 2012 it has stably 
stayed around a score of 30 percent. The unfavorability of South 
Koreans toward the United Statessteadily decreased from 2002 and 
Figure 5 How Japan and South Korea See the United States and China, 
2002-2015
Source: Pew Research Center (2016).
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never went beyond a score of 20 percent since 2009. In both nations, 
anti-Americanism seems out of the question in the publicsphere. 
That is to say, they converge on the solid foundation with the United 
States as an alliance partner.
　The unfavorability of both nations toward China diverges, however. 
In both Japan and South Korea, it increased around 2010 when the 
negative perception of the publics of the two nations converged 
around the score of 60 percent. Since then, the two countries 
started to diverge: Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan has dramatically 
increased from 61 percent in 2011 to 89 percent in 2015 whereas 
anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea has vividly dwindled from 
56 percent in 2010 to 37 percent in 2015. In other words, today a 
majority of Japanese are highly suspicious while a majority of South 
Koreansare fairly comfortable with the rise of China. This asymmetric 
perception of the Chinese threat between the two countries is surely 
analarming ideational factor in shaping Japan-South Korea relations. 
In a situation where most Japanese see China as a near-enemy and 
most South Koreans see China as a near-friend, it is highly unlikely to 
have a healthy relationship between the two nations.
　The asymmetric perception of China’s threat between Japan and 
South Korea reflects the asymmetric perception of Japan’s apology 
between them.  Table 2 shows how Chinese, Japanese, and South 
Koreans think about Japan’s apology for its military actions during 
the 1930s and 1940s. In 2008, 76 percent of Chinese and 96 percent 
of South Koreans believed that Japan did not apologize sufficiently 
while 41 percent of Japanese agreed with them. In 2013, 78 percent 
of Chinese and 98 percent of South Koreans think that Japan did 
not apologize sufficiently whereas 28 percent of Japanese share 
that opinion. To put it another way, virtually all South Koreans and 
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four-fifths of the Chinese see that Japan’s apology is not sufficient 
while three-fifths of the Japanese people ponder that its apology is 
sufficient.  This huge chasm in historical remembrance is another 
crucial factor that shapes Japan-South Korea relations in a negative 
direction.
Table 2 How China, Japan, and South Korea Think about Japan’s 
Apology
2008 2013
Apologized 
sufficiently
Not
apologized
sufficiently
No apology
necessary
Apologized
sufficiently
Not
apologized
sufficiently
No apology
necessary
China 8 76 2 4 78 2
Japan 42 41 10 48 28 15
South
Korea 1 96 1 1 98 1
Source: Pew Research Center (2013).
Table 3 How Japanese and South Korean Publics and Experts See 
Each Other
Japanese
Public
South Korean
Public
Japanese
Experts
South Korean
Experts
2013 37.3 76.6 27.5 28.8
2014 54.4 70.9 44.2 36.8
2015 52.4 72.5 43.2 36.4
Source: Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2015).
　The marked divergence in how to perceive China’s rise and 
historical remembrance between the two countries affects divergence 
in opinions between the publics and the experts of both nations 
see Table 3). It is notable that anti-Japanese sentiment of South 
Koreans is higher than anti-South Korean sentiment of Japanese 
among the publicswhile anti-South Korean sentiment of Japanese 
is higher than anti-Japanese sentiment of South Korean among the 
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experts. For instance, between the two publics, 72 percent of South 
Koreans reveal unfavorable attitude toward Japan while 52 percent 
of Japanese disclose the same attitude toward South Korea. Among 
the experts, however, 36 percent of South Koreans show negative 
perception of Japan whereas 43 percent of Japanese express the 
same perception of South Korea in 2015. It appears that Japanese 
experts are more sensitive to divergence in the rise of China and 
historical remembrance issues than South Korean ones.
　The reason that we observe differences in responses to ideational 
distribution of powers between Japanese and South Korean experts 
seems to originate from the broad transformation of political elites in 
both nations. This leads to domestic factors that shape Japan-South 
Korean relations.
　Figure 6 displays the ideological distribution of the House of 
Figure 6 Ideological Distributions of Japanese National Diet Members 
in 2003 and 2014
Source: Taniguchi and Asahi Shimbun (2016).
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Representatives members of Japan’s National Diet in 2003 and 2014. 
On one-dimensional policy space, 0 represent the most progressive 
and 10 represents the most conservative. In 2003, among 456 members, 
the value of mean is 5.23 and the value of standard deviation is 2.38. 
In 2014, among 427 members, the value of mean is 5.78 and the value 
of standard deviation is 1.45. Between 2003 and 2014, the center of 
gravity among political elites assuredly moves in the conservative 
direction as progressives thin out and conservatives thicken. This 
change implies that dominant political elites in Japan have little 
incentive to send apologetic remembrance toward South Korea since 
there is little capability for progressives to provoke backlash against 
conservatives’ unapologetic remembrance. Due to conservatization 
of Japanese political elites, it will be difficult to receive apologetic 
remembrance from the Japanese government.
Figure 7 Ideological Distributions of South Korean National Assembly 
Members in 2002 and 2012
Source: Korean Association of Party Studies and Joongang Ilbo (2016).
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　Figure 7 exhibits ideological distribution of the South Korean 
National Assembly members in 2002 and 2012. On one-dimensional 
policy space, 0 represent the most progressive and 10 represents the 
most conservative.  In 2002, among 238 members, the value of mean 
is 4.90 and the value of standard deviation is 1.56. In 2012, among 
223 members, the value of mean is 5.00 and the value of standard 
deviation is 1.80. Between 2002 and 2012, the center of gravity among 
political elites stays around 5 constantly and both progressives and 
conservatives thicken. This change implies that dominant political 
elites in South Korea have little capacity to accept signals from 
Japan since there are plenty of incentives for progressives as well 
as conservatives to incite backlash against Japan’s remembrance. 
Due to polarization of South Korean political elites, it will be hard 
to accept any sort of remembrance signal, be it apologetic or 
unapologetic, for the South Korean government.
　In sum, the distribution of material powers between Japan and 
South Korea is charaterized by convergence and symmetry while 
the distribution of ideational powers between them is described 
by divergence and asymmetry. These international changes mirror 
domestic transformations in which conservatization of Japanese 
political elites and polarization of South Korean political elites raise 
the bar for historiacl reconciliation between the two nations.  
Conclusion
　This article has discussed whether we are going through the 
worst period of Japan-South Korea relations. It found that Japan-
South Korea relations are uniquely flagging cross-nationally and 
unprecedentedly waning historically. The reduction in gaps in terms 
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of economic, military, and social powers between the two countries is 
a set of international factors that confuse Japanese and elevate South 
Koreans. The increasing dissimilarity in dealing with the rise of China 
and historical reconciliation issues is another set of international 
factors that make Japan-South Korea relations complicated. The 
conservatization of Japanese political elites lessens the incentives 
to send sincere apologetic remembrance to South Koreans. The 
polarization of South Korean political elites diminishes the capability 
to accept strategic apologetic remembrance from Japanese. It seems 
that Japan-South Korea relations is at a stalemate. 
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Appendix How Japanese and South Korean Publics See Each Other
Asahi Shimbun- 
Donga Ilbo
Japan’s
Cabinet
Office
Gallup
Korea
Pew Research
Center
Japan SouthKorea Japan
South
Korea Japan
South
Korea
1984 19 39 47.1 - - -
1988 21 51 42.9 - - -
1990 23 66 50.8 - - -
1991 - - 51.4 58 - -
1993 - - 51.8 63 - -
1995 21 69 54 - - -
1997 17 65 57.5 75 - -
1999 12 43 46.9 - -
2001 15 57 45.5 69 - -
2003 - - 41 62 - -
2005 22 63 44.3 79 - -
2006 - - 47.1 - 43 -
2007 - - 42.6 68 - 72
2008 - - 40.9 - 40 51
2009 - - 34.2 73 - -
2011 - - 35.3 44 - -
2012 17 50 59 - - -
2013 - - 58 - - 77
2014 - - 66.4 - - 77
2015 - - 64.7 74 75 73
Sources: Isozaki (2015) for Asahi Shimbun-Donga Ilbo surveys; Japan’s 
Cabinet Office (2016) for Japan’s Cabinet Office surveys; Gallup Korea (2015) 
for Gallup Korea surveys; Pew Research Center (2015) for Pew Research 
Center surveys.
